By Mohammed Rahman Ahmed
The events in Syria over the past 13 years represent a struggle between two competing natural gas pipeline projects destined for Western Europe.
The Qatari gas project would route through Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria-Turkey-Europe. The Iranian gas project would traverse Iraq-Syria-Mediterranean Sea.
The first project garnered support from America, Europe, Turkey, and Gulf Sunni states, aiming to weaken Russia’s role as supplier of over 30% of Europe’s natural gas while simultaneously undermining Iran. However, Bashar al-Assad obstructed this initiative, backing instead the Iranian proposal supported by Russia and China in opposition to the Qatar-Turkey-Europe pipeline.
Consequently, Gulf states (particularly Qatar), Turkey, and America expended billions of dollars arming and financing Syrian opposition groups, seeking either Assad’s overthrow to implement their project or to foment internal conflict and instability to prevent the Iranian-Russian pipeline from materializing.
Currently, the Iranian gas project has concluded, leaving apparently only the Qatar-Turkey-Western project remaining. This development represents a significant windfall for Turkey, previously dependent on Russian and formerly Iranian gas. The project substantially strengthens Turkey’s strategic and geo-economic position as Europe’s energy corridor, but questions remain whether Syria’s transformation will proceed smoothly for Turkish interests.
Israel played a decisive role in weakening Syria and Iran’s regional proxies who supported Damascus. Israel has invested considerably in this effort, seeking economic benefits through its own project routing energy pipelines to the Mediterranean via Haifa port for European markets. Additionally, Israel aims to permanently secure its borders from threats. To this end, Israel will never permit the reestablishment of a strong, unified central Syrian state, particularly with dominant Islamist extremist factions. The anticipated scenario mirrors Iraq’s fragmentation, with ethnic communities, especially Kurds and Druze, gaining autonomous regions, ensuring continuous conflict with the central government.
Israel further seeks to sever the Sunni corridor extending from the Gulf toward Turkey.
The Israeli and Turkish projects for reshaping Syria fundamentally conflict both economically and politically. Economically, Turkey desires the new Syria as a conduit connecting regional energy to Turkey and onward to Europe. Israel aims to redirect this corridor through Kurdish and Druze territories toward Israeli territory and the Mediterranean.
Politically, Turkey seeks to establish a unified Sunni centralized state under its complete hegemony, paralleling Iran’s role in Iraq by strengthening the central government against other components. Conversely, Israel prefers a weakened, fragmented Syria that can never again threaten Israeli national security, supporting Kurdish and Druze communities toward this objective.
The success of either competing project significantly impacts the future and destiny of Kurds, particularly in Kurdistan Region. Kurds must navigate this sensitive regional transformation prudently, setting aside internal disputes and avoiding peripheral distractions. United Kurdish policy should align with whichever project secures their future. Kurds cannot remain spectators but must participate actively as stakeholders.
In politics, securing support and alliances requires identifying mutual interests rather than emotional appeals. One must demonstrate that “my strength and survival equals your strength and survival.” The question remains whether Kurds have diplomatically convinced regional and global powers of this proposition to benefit from these transformations rather than being marginalized.
It remains crucial for Kurds across all four parts of Kurdistan, especially in the south and west, to maintain unity and shared vision regarding their destiny.