By Sherko Kirmanj
Iraq is among the countries with the fewest population censuses conducted, and those that have taken place have historically been manipulated for political and ideological ends. While the 2024 census is ostensibly non-political and framed as a tool for economic and social planning, I argue that it is underpinned by deeply political, ideological, religious, sectarian, and ethnic motives. In this essay, I will elucidate the rationale behind excluding questions on nationality/ethnicity and religion/sect from the census and highlight the significant dangers this poses to the Kurds in Iraq.
To begin with, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has both proposed and agreed to exclude questions on nationality/ethnicity from the census. This decision likely stems from concerns that such data might be used in Kirkuk and other disputed areas to undermine the constitutional provisions for a referendum, as outlined in the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. These fears are heightened by the large influx of Arabs into Kirkuk and its surroundings, driven by the Sunni-Shiite civil war and the ongoing Arabization process, particularly since October 16, 2017.
The more pressing question, however, is why the Shiite-majority government in Baghdad opposed the inclusion of religious/sectarian data in the census. To understand this, it is necessary to examine the demographic transformations among Iraq’s Shiite population over the past century, particularly in Baghdad.
The first Iraqi census, conducted in 1927, lacked reliable data and omitted questions on nationality/ethnicity, though it did record religion and sect. Informal surveys from the early 1920s indicate that Baghdad’s population at the time was approximately 250,000, of which 130,000 (52%) were Sunni Muslims, 54,000 (22%) were Shiites Muslims, and 50,000 (20%) were Jews. Notably, many of the Shiites in Baghdad were Kurdish Failis, indicating that Arab Shiites constituted a very small minority in the capital at the time.
By 1957, Baghdad’s population had quadrupled to approximately 800,000, driven largely by migration from rural areas. This migration significantly increased the proportion of Arab Shiites in Baghdad, raising the Shiite share of the population from 22% to nearly 50% (see my book Identity and Nation in Iraq, p. 70). Following the Sunni-Shiite civil war of 2003–2008, large numbers of Sunnis were displaced, particularly from Baghdad, transforming the city into a predominantly Shiite metropolis. For example, the results of the 2009 provincial elections revealed that Sunni parties secured only 16% of Baghdad’s seats, compared to 70% for Shiite parties. Similarly, in the 2021 parliamentary elections, Sunni coalitions won only 17% of the votes in Baghdad, while Shiite parties garnered over 82%. These figures illustrate a dramatic demographic shift: Baghdad has transitioned from a Sunni-majority city to one where Shiites now constitute more than 80% of the population—a trend evident to anyone who has visited the city in recent years, as I did twice this year.
The exclusion of religious/sectarian questions from the census thus appears to be an attempt to obscure the extent of Sunni demographic decline, not only in Baghdad but across Iraq. A census revealing this decline would likely provoke widespread outrage, both within Iraq and across the Sunni Arab and Islamic world, where many would lament the transformation of Baghdad—the historic capital of the Abbasid Caliphate—into a predominantly Shiite city. Moreover, such data would illuminate the Shiiteization of historically Sunni regions such as Basra, Samarra, and Tala’far, as well as the complete demographic shifts in other Sunni provinces.
In the absence of explicit data on ethnicity and religion, however, there is a risk of manipulation. Without these categories, it is unclear in whose favor such manipulation might occur, further fueling distrust. In essence, the exclusion of a sectarian identity box in the census is intended to conceal the ongoing process of Iraq’s Shiiteization.
The exclusion of nationality/ethnicity from the census also has significant implications for Iraq’s Kurdish population. Since the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921, the proportion of Kurds in the national population has steadily declined. According to the 1947 census, Kurds constituted over 28% of Iraq’s population. By 1987, this figure had dropped to less than 22%, and in 1997, it fell below 20%. Post-2003 estimates place the Kurdish population at around 20%, including those outside the KRG-administered areas. This downward trend is alarming: from 1947 to 2003, the Kurdish share of Iraq’s population decreased by 8%, reflecting a continual decline.
This demographic shift can be partially attributed to the Kurdistan Region’s relative development since 1991. Improved living standards and education levels have contributed to lower fertility rates among Kurds compared to Arab populations, a phenomenon commonly observed in more developed societies. However, this demographic trend poses significant challenges for Kurdish political representation and resource allocation within Iraq.
According to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Iraq’s population in 2017 was 37 million, with only 5.75 million residing in the Kurdistan Region—a decrease from 17% of the total population in 2003 to 15.5% in 2017. Projections for the 2024 census suggest that this figure will fall further, potentially to below 14%.
Several factors underlie the exclusion of nationality/ethnicity from the census form. First, it is estimated that approximately one million Arabs have migrated to the Kurdistan Region since 2003. Introducing a question on nationality or ethnicity in the census would have formally acknowledged this Arab presence, potentially raising Kurdish concerns about its implications for future referenda or constitutional amendments. For instance, the Iraqi Constitution allows for amendments to be blocked if three provinces vote against them. An increasing Arab presence in Kurdistan provinces could jeopardize this safeguard.
Second, similarly, unofficial reports from credible sources estimate that around 600,000 Arabs have relocated to Kirkuk and its surrounding areas during the same period. Any formal recognition of this significant settlement could trigger intense reactions from Kurds. Excluding nationality/ethnicity data thus helps to obscure these realities.
Third, the acknowledgment of a long-term demographic decline among Kurds—from 28% of Iraq’s population in 1947 to an estimated 14% today—would exacerbate fears of marginalization and weaken Kurdish political influence. This decline has already manifested in parliamentary representation: Kurdish parties won 58 of 270 seats in the 2005 elections (21%), but their share has since dropped to approximately 17.5%. Projections based on the 2024 census suggest this figure could fall to 15% or lower.
Looking further ahead, Iraq’s population is expected to reach 80 million by 2050. Given current fertility trends, the Kurdish proportion is likely to decline to just 7%, rendering the Kurdish position within Iraq increasingly untenable.
These trends underscore the urgent need for strategic thinking among Kurdish leaders and civil societies. In my view, the Kurds in Iraq face two stark choices: independence or suffocation. If independence is not feasible at this stage, the Kurdistan Region must strive to establish a state-like entity with robust institutions—similar to Quebec in Canada. Such an entity should safeguard Kurdish language, culture, history, and traditions while solidifying its territorial and political autonomy.
In conclusion, the exclusion of sectarian and national categories from the 2024 Iraqi census reflects broader political and demographic dynamics that pose significant challenges for both Kurds and Sunnis. For the Kurds, the imperative is clear: either achieve sovereignty and independence or pursue a comprehensive strategy of “Quebecization” to preserve their identity, territory and position within Iraq. Failure to do so risks consigning the Kurdish people to political and cultural irrelevance within a rapidly changing Iraq.