By Kazhan Abdullah Murad
The Kurdistan Region is a non-state actor; but at the same time, it is not a paramilitary or an armed actor that poses a threat to the security and interests of other countries. This is an important point that gives the Kurdistan Region a key role, because neither this Region can go beyond its constitutional and geographical framework and act outside international law and regional equations, nor can other countries treat the Kurdistan Region as an international paramilitary actor.
This factor makes the Kurdistan Region constantly play a role or determine to play a role by other international actors in regional equations. In other words, any regional coalition must take into account the geopolitical position of the Kurdistan Region, whether to its advantage or disadvantage.
Since the Kurdistan Region has domestic and international legal status, this gives the Kurdistan Region the ability to play a role as a quasi-state in the regional and international arena. This location and Baghdad’s proximity to Tehran have enabled the Kurdistan Region to effectively pursue paradiplomacy, often appearing as a semi-independent state, with the three countries supporting Erbil more than Baghdad.
Since Trump’s first four-day foreign trip, to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in May 2025, the Kurdistan Region’s position has been boosted by two regional powers, Turkey and Iran. Both Iran and Turkey feel they have new regional rivals in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar (although Qatar is an ally of Turkey but has differences with Iran on many issues).
In the case of Iraq, even if Baghdad wants to prevent the Kurdistan Region from establishing direct relations with these three Sunni Arab countries, the Arab identity of these three countries and the Arab identity of Iraq compels Baghdad not to create serious obstacles to these relations. All three Arab countries are also moving towards social secularization, which is a point of convergence between the Kurdistan Region and these three countries. The Kurdistan Region’s diplomacy is also the basis for diversifying its foreign relations.
This is considered as a shield for the Kurdistan Region so that no country can implement a “high pressure policy” against the Kurdistan Region. The “various coalitions” in the region on the one hand and the multidimensional diplomacy of the Kurdistan Region, especially by the President of the Kurdistan Region, on the other, have continuously created new opportunities for the Kurdistan Region.
Such equations and alliances can be defined as a “salvation path” for the Kurdistan Region. The events in the Middle East are very multidimensional.
Due to the recognized position of its constitution at the regional and international levels on the one hand and the existence of constant conflict between the countries of the region on the other hand and the characteristics of semi-state actors.
Therefore, there is always an opportunity for the Kurdistan Region to protect itself from the threat of an international, regional or other regional alliance in the region.
This characteristic stems from the position of the Kurdistan Region, which has been able to maintain the balance of power since its establishment in 1992, even during the civil war and the division of the Kurdistan Region into two regions.
But more importantly, how does the Kurdistan Region protect its strategic interests of “survival” and “continuity” amidst these opportunities? This requires multidimensional diplomacy that strikes a balance between all regional actors. In other words, it is important for the Kurdistan Region to treat the countries in the region on an equal footing. Because the Kurdistan Region’s support for any country in the region will incite other countries against the Kurdistan Region.