By Hiwa Majid Khalil
Iraq has never been a naturally cohesive state — it has struggled with internal and external border disputes since it was formed. When South Kurdistan was folded into Iraq in 1926 (five years after the state’s creation in 1921), Kurds began enduring repeated persecution under every Iraqi government that followed. Notably, the severity of this treatment didn’t depend on whether the ruling government was strong or weak, monarchic or republican, single-party or pluralistic, democratic or authoritarian, religious or secular, or led by Sunni or Shiite factions — the outcome for Kurds was consistently negative regardless of the system in power.
Between 1921 and 1958, under the monarchy, Iraq cycled through 59 different governments and 23 prime ministers — many with military backgrounds — in under four decades, with some cabinets collapsing after just weeks. This churn happened despite the fact that lasting governance and political stability are essential for a country’s development, which suggests Iraq was dysfunctional from its founding. The Kurds weren’t responsible for this chaos, but because Kurdistan’s territory was folded into a centrally-governed, unstable state, they bore the consequences anyway — including deliberate efforts by Baghdad to stifle Kurdish economic and cultural progress.
From 1958 to 1968, the country experienced four military takeovers, and even after Iraq’s shift away from monarchy in 1958, military figures continued to dominate politics. That pattern held until Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath government fell in 2003, which brought a multi-party system and a model of “consensus democracy.” Yet Iraq’s political class has struggled to genuinely embrace this framework. Instead, calls for renewed centralization have grown — starting with sidelining Sunni Arab politicians and eventually producing a government that excluded Kurdish ministers entirely, leaving a cabinet that looked almost exclusively Shiite. Because Iraq’s various communities share little common political culture, consensus democracy was never going to work there, and points to the emergence of ISIS as a direct consequence of this failed experiment.
Across all three eras — monarchy, republic and consensus democracy — the throughline for Kurds has been a persistent clash with centralized authority. As an example, Haider al-Abadi, upon assuming power, unilaterally announced a ten-ministry cabinet and dictated terms to other parties before his government even formed — behavior as authoritarian instinct showing itself even before he held full power. Given this, the author is skeptical that Iraq’s government will chart a fundamentally different course.
Following the Kurdistan Region’s independence referendum, it can be argued that the central issue between Kurds and Baghdad going forward will be territorial boundaries. As such, Kurdish leadership’s top priority should be securing clearly defined borders for Iraqi Kurdistan — regardless of whether it ends up as a federal region, a confederal entity, an independent state, or some other arrangement. The reasoning given is that Iraqis are now aware Kurdish secession remains a possibility, which will drive efforts to alter the demographic makeup of disputed Kurdish territories still under Baghdad’s control. This is already visibly happening since the October 16 events, pointing specifically to actions by the Hashd al-Shaabi militias and Kirkuk’s current governor.