By Khadija Askandir
Iraq is a country with a long and complex history. Its modern borders were drawn by the League of Nations in 1920, the monarchy was established in 1921, and it gained formal independence from the United Kingdom in 1932. However, Iraq’s trajectory has been shaped not by its people but by the hands of empires. In 2003, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq under the pretext of dismantling the Ba’athist regime. A new government was installed in 2005, and by 2011, American forces officially withdrew.
Yet Iraq’s foundational problem lies deeper. Its historical formation, imposed by colonial arrangements such as the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement and the League of Nations mandate, resulted in a state without a unified national identity. It brought together Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, and others—communities with distinct religious, ethnic, and cultural affiliations—into an artificial union without a shared national narrative. Iraq’s foundations were not built by its people but engineered through British colonialism. This legacy undermines its status as a truly sovereign and unified nation-state, positioning it instead as a “failed state.”
After the U.S. invasion, efforts were made to implant democracy in Iraq. While institutional frameworks were introduced and elections held, they lacked deep-rooted legitimacy. Rather than ideology or national vision, sectarianism emerged as the dominant force shaping Iraqi politics. Political discourse shifted from broad ideological movements to narrow sectarian interests. Institutions became fragmented, and the promise of reform was marred by corruption, inefficiency, and foreign interference. The state transformed into a battlefield for competing sectarian elites, militias, and external powers—none of which genuinely represented the diverse Iraqi population.
The concept of the “failed state” gained prominence in the early 1990s, first articulated by the U.S. envoy to the United Nations during discussions on humanitarian intervention in Somalia. One of its key features is the inability to manage internal conflict and the ever-present threat of civil war. Failed states are marked by persistent ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions—conditions that define Iraq’s post-2003 reality. In such states, conflict between communities is not merely political but existential.
Moreover, a failed state lacks effective control over its own borders and territory. In The Failed State, philosopher Noam Chomsky defines these states as those that are either unwilling or incapable of protecting their citizens from violence and collapse. Even if democratic structures exist on paper, the true power lies with ruling elites who control state institutions and resources for their own benefit. In these scenarios, governance becomes a tool for self-enrichment, not public service. According to international legal standards, even authoritarian or totalitarian regimes can fall under the category of failed states when they cannot guarantee stability and public welfare.
Indicators of state failure include rising levels of violence and crime, the weakening of central authority, and the erosion of the rule of law. When law enforcement becomes ineffective, urban crime rates surge and homelessness spreads—becoming a symbol of national breakdown.
What is critical to understand is that Iraq has exhibited the characteristics of a failed state across multiple regimes throughout its modern history. Whether under monarchy, dictatorship, or democracy, political power has consistently been monopolized by a narrow elite—parties, factions, and armed groups that control the country’s wealth and resources without regard for national unity or public welfare.