By Payraw Anwar
After months of political bargaining and institutional deadlock, the new Iraqi government has finally been formed and granted confidence by the Iraqi Parliament. Ali Falih Al-Zaidi was elected as Prime Minister, while 15 ministers received parliamentary approval as part of the new cabinet. Nevertheless, several sovereign ministries — most notably the Ministry of Interior — remain vacant due to ongoing disputes among Iraq’s major political factions.
The new administration assumes power at a time when the Iraqi state is confronting deep-rooted structural and historical crises. Iraq continues to struggle with chronic electricity shortages, weak public services, rising unemployment, widespread poverty, and entrenched corruption. Beyond these domestic challenges, the Iraqi state has increasingly lost its ability to exercise full sovereignty, as armed groups and external influences continue to shape the country’s political and security landscape.
Since 2003, Iraq has witnessed the institutionalization of corruption, abuse of power, and the expansion of militia influence over state institutions, including parliament, the government, and segments of the military establishment. These realities have created a highly fragile political environment in which every incoming prime minister inherits an accumulation of unresolved crises that are difficult to address within the current political framework.
The challenges facing Prime Minister Ali Falih Al-Zaidi are particularly significant for several reasons. First, he lacks an independent political base. Unlike many previous Iraqi leaders, he does not possess a parliamentary bloc or even a single parliamentary seat to support his administration. Coming primarily from a business background rather than a political one, he remains a relatively unknown figure within Iraq’s public sphere. While experience in business may contribute to managerial thinking, governing a deeply fragmented political system such as Iraq requires strong political alliances and institutional backing.
The absence of parliamentary support also leaves the Prime Minister politically vulnerable. Without a loyal bloc inside parliament, his government can be pressured, weakened, or even dissolved by the same political forces that facilitated his rise to office. In this context, his appointment appears less the result of broad national consensus and more a product of elite political calculations.
Equally important is the role of the Coordination Framework, which remains one of the most influential political coalitions in Iraq today. The alliance appears to prefer a prime minister with limited political leverage, enabling dominant factions within the framework to maintain greater influence over state decision-making processes. From this perspective, a politically weak prime minister becomes easier to manage both domestically and externally. In practical terms, the weaker the prime minister, the stronger the influence of the coalition that brought him to power.
Ultimately, Iraq’s crisis is not merely a crisis of political leadership, but a crisis of governance and legitimacy. Political figures may change, cabinets may be reshuffled, and governments may come and go, yet the underlying structural crises persist. The current political process continues to face questions regarding representation, legitimacy, and the genuine reflection of public will.
Therefore, unless meaningful institutional reforms are implemented—reforms capable of addressing corruption, limiting militia influence, strengthening state sovereignty, and restoring public trust — the cycle of accumulated crises is likely to continue regardless of who occupies the office of prime minister.