By Dr Hiwa M. Khalil
On 7/5/2026, Ali al-Zaidi presented his fourteen-topic agenda to the Speaker of Parliament. The nomination of Ali al-Zaidi itself was a sign of disagreement between the parties within the framework of Shiite coordination. Therefore, within a week, Ali al-Zaidi created a fourteen-topic agenda that not only did not take into account the concerns of the Kurds and Sunnis, but also did not even contact the parties to the Coordination Framework. The agenda appears to have been developed in a hurry and does not consider the features of Iraq’s social and political structures. Instead of a federal agenda, this one appears to be written for a centralized state.
Furthermore, the agenda will cause issues for Iraq in the future, both at home and abroad. The Kurdistan Region is only referenced twice in the program as the party responsible for carrying out the agenda’s points; neither Baghdad nor Erbil are granted any authority or privileges to carry out the agenda. There is no way to carry out Ali al-Zaidi’s objective. Here are a few points:
First, in the first topic, the point 1, mentioned that weapons should be in the hands of the state, while the second point talks about strengthening the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), while the Donald Trump administration calls for the dissolution of PMF.
Second, because the Kurdistan Region has an official diplomatic organization, point 7 of the second foreign policy item asserts that only official diplomatic channels handle Iraq’s international contacts, which is a kind of centralism.
Third, the third point, which addresses financial and economic reform, ignores the role of the Kurdistan Region and the provinces in favor of concentrating more on Iraq as a centralized state not as a federal one. Economic centralism will fail in the current economic environment which focused on decentralism rather than centralization of economy.
Fourth, the Kurdistan Region’s role in exporting hydrocarbon and supplying gas from its gas reserves to Iraqi power plants is not mentioned in the fourth point that related to gas and oil. Even with regard to the oil and gas law’s enactment, it just states that “work is underway to enact the oil and gas law” without outlining a timeline or procedure for doing so.
Reforms in agriculture, health, and poverty reduction were among the other subjects covered. These are all good things, but they are challenging to implement while militias dominate the Iraqi economy, finance, and oil. Furthermore, neither the Kurdistan Region as a government nor Kurdish political parties were involved in the program’s drawing, and only twice on the last page did Ali al-Zaidi mention the Kurdistan region’s name as a duty to carry out the agenda’s objectives. Furthermore, the execution of Article 140 of the constitution, which deals with conflict zones, has been mentioned by all past Iraqi cabinets; nevertheless, this program does not address this article or how to resolve the issues between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region.
Therefore, considering the agenda of the upcoming Iraqi cabinet, the disputes between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad are unlikely to be resolved and may even intensify. In addition, the Kurdistan Region itself continues to face internal political challenges, as the parliament remains inactive and the tenth cabinet has yet to be formed. As a result, relations between Baghdad and Erbil over the next four years are expected to remain challenging, particularly due to Ali al-Zaidi’s lack of political experience.