By Dr. Adnan Shwan
Among the factors that contributed to the 2017 Kurdistan Region (KR) independence referendum were the perceived shortcomings in the Iraqi state-building process. As President Masoud Barzani expressed in his book For History, these concerns included uncertainty surrounding Iraq’s future, challenges related to coexistence among different communities, issues regarding the rule of law, and the implementation of the permanent Iraqi Constitution.
The ongoing war in the Middle East has demonstrated more clearly than ever that Iraq is a fragile and weak state, incapable of achieving its goals. The role of the deep state in Iraq has become strongly obvious; the Iraqi government is unable to control armed groups, and these groups, in turn, are dragging Iraq into the maelstrom of the regional war. Therefore, President Barzani’s concerns appear to have been well-founded. Consequently, had the Kurds united to confront the challenges following the referendum, the KR would be in a far more advanced and powerful position right now.
In his book “Politics”, Aristotle argues that the primary duty of the state is to protect its citizens both domestically and abroad. Max Weber considers this protection a fundamental duty of the state, achieved through its monopoly on legitimate power. That is, the state must resolve problems and conflicts rationally and peacefully, not through violence. If the state fails in this task, its very structure is jeopardized, and it transforms into an instrument of oppression against its citizens.
If the state fails to fulfill this fundamental responsibility, the integrity of its institutional structure becomes compromised, thereby increasing the risk of its transformation into a mechanism of coercion and oppression directed against its own citizens. Since the outbreak of the conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, non-state armed groups operating outside the framework of Iraqi state authority have launched approximately 450 missiles and drones targeting the KR.
Before analyzing the situation in Iraq, I would like to point out that after 2003, a concept became widespread among many researchers about Iraq, namely that Iraq is a barren state, or a stolen state, or as Raphael Fait says: Iraq is a failed state. The Fund for Peace, established in 1957, identifies several criteria for defining failed states:
1- The loss of state authority over a significant portion of its territory, or the erosion of its capacity to maintain a legitimate monopoly over the use of force within the state’s territory, whether in whole or in part. This shortcoming was evident when the Iraqi government lost control of much of its territory during the rise of ISIS. Currently, the Iraqi government and state are not able to monopolize legitimate power. Armed groups are now openly threatening the government and the government is unable to control them.
2- Inability to make decisive decisions. This is clearly evident in the Iraqi state, which is unable to make a decisive decision to maintain its neutrality in the ongoing war in the Middle East. This is due to the influence of armed groups on the Iraqi government’s decisions.
3- The failure of the state to provide essential public services.
4- The lack of capacity to engage effectively and appropriately with other members of the international community.
In the past, the Iraqi government has tried to address these two points, increasing the amount of services, but in most places and areas, services are in a very bad state, in terms of communication It has tried to adapt to the international community and has hosted conferences such as Arab summits.
In addition to the applicability of these criteria to Iraq, it is important to examine five profound crises identified by Lucian Pye and Joseph Lapalombara in their work Crises and Their Impact on Political Development:
1- Identity Crisis: Undoubtedly, Iraq experiences a profound identity crisis, characterized by deep divisions along ethnic, sectarian, and communal lines among various groups. These identity-based cleavages frequently shape political dynamics, to the extent that Iraqi politics is often perceived and analyzed as predominantly sectarian in nature.
2- Legitimacy Crisis: This crisis is deeply evident in Iraq. For instance, low levels of public participation in elections, alongside recurring waves of protests—particularly those witnessed in 2015 and 2019—reflect a significant deficit in political legitimacy within the state
3- Participation Crisis: There is a gradual decline in citizens’ political participation, which in turn weakens the legitimacy of the political system.
4- Authority Hegemoney Crisis: As noted previously, the Iraqi government lacks the capacity to maintain a legitimate monopoly over the use of force. In practice, armed groups operating outside the law exercise de facto authority, often implementing policies independently of the state and undermining governmental control.
5- 5. The distribution crisis, the distribution of wealth in a fair manner creates national unity, but what is happening in Iraq is a failure to distribute the country’s wealth in a fair manner. The last manifestation of this policy was the salary cuts of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employees. In addition, the talk of money laundering abroad and sending dollars to Iran has created a huge burden on the shoulders of citizens due to the appreciation of the dollar and US sanctions on the central bank. Trump’s envoy to Syria and Iraq, Tom Barak, also stressed that Iraq has imposed economic sanctions on the KR and will punish the KR.
The challenges of state-building in Iraq have never been more evident. Iraq remains a fragmented state, with its sovereignty under persistent threat. Unless these deep-rooted issues are addressed, the country is unlikely to achieve modern statehood or experience substantial political and economic development.