Payraw Anwar
September 30 is approaching, and with it comes a critical deadline for Iraq’s armed groups. The question is no longer simply whether weapons will be handed over to the state, but what will happen if some armed groups refuse to comply.
During the Iraqi Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in mid-July 2026, Ali al-Zaidi vowed to dissolve armed groups operating outside the authority of the state. In practical terms, this means that weapons must be brought under state control. The Prime Minister also signed a memorandum of understanding with U.S. President Donald Trump, one of whose key points was to bring weapons under state control and eliminate armed groups operating outside the state’s authority. September 30, 2026, was set as the deadline for completing this process.
The Iraqi government has already taken some steps. Some armed groups have handed over their weapons and offices to the state. Under the plan, their weapons, human resources, and materials are expected to be integrated into state institutions within the specified period.
But not everyone appears ready to follow the same path.
Some armed groups have yet to take meaningful steps towards integration and remain unwilling to become part of the state apparatus. This is particularly true of radical groups that reject assimilation into state institutions or refuse to accept the rules and authority of the state. This creates a fundamental challenge for the Iraqi government: how can the state establish a monopoly over weapons when some groups possess both the political influence and the capacity to resist?
The regional conflict makes the situation even more complicated. While the United States seeks to exert influence over Iraq’s internal politics and domestic dynamics, Baghdad is attempting to strike a delicate balance between regional and international powers due to two points:
First, Iraq’s geopolitical position makes it particularly vulnerable to regional competition. As a state and society, Iraq shares political, social, and strategic commonalities with its neighbouring countries. This creates difficulties for independent decision-making and maintaining political autonomy, especially because some armed groups have links with regional countries. Balancing these competing influences may therefore be Iraq’s best strategy for reducing political risks.
Second, the Iraqi Prime Minister is attempting to overcome the economic and financial crisis affecting the country as a result of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the war between the United States and Iran. If Iraq fails to maintain this balance, it could face economic sanctions and an even deeper crisis, potentially placing significant pressure on the current cabinet.
September 30, therefore, should not be viewed simply as another date on the political calendar. It could become a turning point in the relationship between the Iraqi state and armed groups.
The United States is closely watching developments, while the MOU must be implemented by the Prime Minister in accordance with his commitments to Trump. At the same time, regional dynamics will continue to shape Iraq’s domestic politics.
Ultimately, the real test will come after the deadline: Can the Iraqi state enforce its authority over all armed groups while maintaining its delicate balance between regional and international powers?