Payraw Anwar
The withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq, particularly US forces, has renewed concerns about the possibility of an Islamic State (ISIS) resurgence, especially in the disputed territories. The Iraqi government appears not to be fully prepared to fill the resulting security gaps for several reasons. The central question, however, is how Baghdad can manage emerging security challenges while it has yet to resolve the issue of armed militia groups operating outside a unified military command structure.
A few days ago, an ISIS member attacked a Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) position west of Kirkuk. Although limited in scale, the attack served as a warning about potential security vulnerabilities and the preparedness of Iraqi forces to replace the role previously played by US troops.
At the beginning of October, the Iraqi government declared that sovereignty had been restored and that Iraqi forces were fully capable of protecting the country. However, Iraq’s experience since 2003 raises questions about this confidence. US forces remained in Iraq until 2011, but following their withdrawal, ISIS expanded rapidly and captured Mosul in 2014. Now, as US forces withdraw again, ISIS may seek to exploit existing security gaps to intensify its activities, particularly in Sunni-majority areas. This possibility highlights one of the major security challenges facing post-US Iraq.
Theoretically, Iraq is presenting itself as ready to enter a new phase of security management. In practice, however, addressing these challenges will not be easy. The country continues to face institutional and technological weaknesses within its military and security establishments.
One of the most significant problems is the incomplete integration of armed militia groups into a unified and accountable national military structure. The absence of a fully unified chain of command undermines the state’s ability to coordinate security operations and exercise exclusive authority over the use of force an essential foundation of a strong and sovereign state.
Moreover, Iraq faces technological and operational limitations. Strengthening its capabilities in drone technology, artificial intelligence, intelligence analysis, data infrastructure and integrated air-defence systems is increasingly important in responding to evolving security threats. Without adequate investment in these areas, Iraqi forces may struggle to identify, monitor and respond effectively to emerging threats.
Equally important is the need to improve military preparedness and operational coordination, particularly in areas vulnerable to ISIS activity. Security forces must be equipped and trained to respond quickly to emerging threats, prevent militants from exploiting gaps between areas of responsibility, and maintain a sustained presence in disputed territories.
Iraq is therefore entering a sensitive phase in its security transition. The withdrawal of foreign forces does not automatically mean that the country has achieved full security independence. Instead, it places greater responsibility on national institutions to demonstrate their capacity to protect the country.
As regional conflicts intensify and competition among regional and international actors continues, Iraq’s security environment may become even more complicated. The challenge for Baghdad is clear: it must turn its claims of sovereignty into practical security capabilities. Ultimately, Iraq’s ability to prevent an ISIS resurgence will depend not only on the departure of foreign forces, but also on the strength, unity and effectiveness of its own security institutions.