By Saadula Aqrawi
For more than two decades, Iraq has struggled with one of the most complex challenges facing modern states, establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Since 2003, the country’s security landscape has been shaped not only by official military and police institutions but also by a wide array of armed groups, many of which gained legitimacy through their role in fighting terrorism and defending the country during periods of crisis.
Today, the new Iraqi government is once again emphasizing the principle that weapons should be restricted to state institutions. This objective has become a central element of efforts to strengthen sovereignty, improve governance, attract investment, and reduce the influence of non-state actors. However, achieving this goal remains politically sensitive and operationally difficult because many militias have become deeply integrated into Iraq’s political, social, and security structures. The expansion of militias in Iraq occurred under exceptional circumstances. Following the collapse of state institutions after 2003, numerous armed groups emerged to fill security vacuums. The rise of sectarian violence, insurgency, and later the threat posed by the Islamic State (ISIS) further increased the role of non-state armed actors. A major turning point came in 2014 when ISIS captured large areas of northern and western Iraq. In response, thousands of volunteers joined armed formations that eventually became part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), known in Arabic as the Hashd al-Shaabi. These groups played a significant role in the military campaign that helped defeat ISIS and reclaim territory. The military success of these formations earned them considerable public legitimacy among many Iraqis. However, their continued possession of independent armed capabilities after the defeat of ISIS has generated ongoing debate about the balance between national security, political influence, and state authority.
Yes, many militia linked organizations have developed political wings that participate in elections and hold seats in parliament. As a result, discussions about weapons are inseparable from broader questions regarding political representation and power-sharing. Over time, some armed groups have developed extensive economic networks. These interests can create incentives to preserve organizational autonomy and resist reforms that would reduce independent sources of influence.
I believe that the future of militias in Iraq is likely to evolve through gradual transformation rather than sudden dissolution. Several scenarios are possible. The Iraqi government’s effort to restrict weapons to the state represents one of the most important tests of Iraq’s post-2003 political order. Success would strengthen sovereignty, improve institutional governance, and enhance long-term stability. Failure could perpetuate a system in which multiple centers of armed power coexist alongside official state institutions. The future of Iraq’s militias will likely depend on a combination of political compromise, security reforms, economic incentives, and evolving public attitudes. Rather than a sudden confrontation between the state and armed groups, the more probable path is a gradual process of integration and institutionalization. Whether this process ultimately results in a unified national security framework remains one of the defining questions facing Iraq in the coming decade.