By Tahseen Wsu Abdullah
Iraqi militias have transformed from a domestic threat into a regional and international danger, launching attacks on neighboring countries, and some of their leaders are linked to cross-border terrorist operations.
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq are no longer merely an official framework; they have become an institutional umbrella providing militias with funding, legitimacy, and influence within the Iraqi state, thus reinforcing their connection to Iranian strategy.
The government of Ali al-Zaidi faces a highly complex dilemma: on the one hand, American and regional pressures push for the dismantling of the PMF and pro-Iranian militias and the elimination of their threat to regional and international security; on the other hand, internal Iranian influence pushes for maintaining, expanding, or superficially restructuring the PMF.
Superficial solutions to the militia problem in Iraq cannot eliminate the threat they pose internally and externally, because Iran and its affiliated factions are capable of reproducing militias under new names and structures. Therefore, a genuine solution hinges on decisive legal and political steps that guarantee the state’s monopoly on weapons and the enforcement of the law.
The Iraqi government of Ali al-Zaidi faces compounded challenges in its attempt to sever the ties between the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the armed militias affiliated with them. This task appears difficult despite promises from some militias, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Jund al-Imam, to lay down their arms in exchange for participation in the government, in compliance with American demands. The difficulty in finding a satisfactory approach to this issue is not unique to Iraq; it stems primarily from Iranian priorities and Tehran’s plans for these militias and their regional and international roles.
The acceptance by some factions of disarming or the formation of a security ministry to contain the PMF and limit the influence of its structures will not necessarily mean the loss of Iran’s dominance over these militias or its ability to rebuild its threats and dangers under new guises. Indeed, some armed factions in Iraq have already begun forming new factions to fill the gaps that might arise if they decide to formally or actually surrender some of their weapons, in order to preserve their political and economic interests and escape American pressure. Iran, in turn, has formed many factions that periodically rise and fall, and may be an alternative to other factions.
This means that the threats posed by the militias cannot be dealt with by formal measures, however serious they may seem, such as integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces into the Federal Security Ministry, but rather through decisive legal, political, and organizational moves that transform the concept of the state’s monopoly on weapons and the application of the law from a general slogan into an actual reality.
So, The Iraqi armed militias have established themselves as a regional and international threat following a series of attacks they launched on Iraq’s neighboring countries, and in the wake of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s revelation of international terrorist operations run by a leader in those militias, which operate under the cover of the official “PMF,” this constitutes enormous pressure on the new Iraqi government headed by Ali al-Zaidi, and puts it before challenges to provide the necessary assurances to neighboring countries and the international community about the steps that will be taken to end this threat.